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ABSTRACT 
Some writers equate values with interests. Philipp Heck defines interests, 
which he treats as synonymous with values, as “all things that man holds 
dear, and all ideals which guide man’s life.”1 There are many writers who 
distinguish between the two concepts and go into the details of the 
distinction, as is explained below. There is an apparent relationship between 
interests, principles, rules, values, objectives and other similar terms. Our 
main purpose is to find the link between interests and values, because the 
term interest dominates all legal discourse. In simple terms, interests 
recognized and enforced by law become rights. To elaborate the meaning of 
interests in relation to values, we need to refer to the work of Roscoe Pound, 
however briefly. There are very few writers who have written as much about 
law, and in such detail, as Roscoe Pound. We will, however, refer to just one 
publication to understand what he has to say about interests.2 Pound says 
interests are sometimes referred to in a general way when these are 
“individual wants, individual claims, individual interests, which it is felt 
ought to be secured by law, through legal rights or through some other legal 
machinery.”3 As compared to this when the term public policy is used it 
refers to social interests. The two are related and “The whole body of 
commmon law is made up of compromises of conflicting individual interests 
in which we turn to some social interest, frequently under the name of public 
policy to determine the limits of a reasonable adjustment.”4 These social 
interests have not been worked out properly, nor has the term “public 
policy” been sufficiently elaborated. Accordingly, he advocated that the 
social interests should be worked out in the same manner as individual 
interests had been worked out in the law. These social interests should be 
secured by the law. Further, resulting legal policies must be identified, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Philipp Heck, The Jurisprudence of Interests: An Outline, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS: 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF MAX RÜMELIN, PHILIPP HECK, PAUL OERTMANN, HEINRICH STOLL, JULIUS 
BINDER AND HERMANN ISAY 29, 33 (M. Magdalena Schoch ed. & trans., 1948). 
2 Roscoe Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN 
SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETIES (1921). 
3 Id. at 16. 
4 Id. at 17. 
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because they govern the delimitation and securing of individual claims. He 
then defines interests as follows: 
  
For the purposes of the science of law we may say that an interest is a claim, 
a want, a demand, of a human being or group of human beings which the 
human being or group of human beings seeks to satisfy and of which social 
engineering in civilized society must therefore take account. So defined, the 
interests which the legal order secures may be claims or wants or demands 
of individual human beings immediately as such (individual interests) of the 
political organization of a society as such, conceived as a person (public 
interests) or of the whole social group as such (social interests).5  
 
Keywords: Values, Interests, public policy, Value judgements. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  The Nature of Values and Interests in Islamic Law 
Following Kelsen’s argument that values of each society will differ in some respects, 
we may safely say that the value system determined by the jurists in Islamic law is 
decidedly different from the one followed in Western legal systems, or indeed any 
other legal system. This is the first major difference between Islamic law and 
Western law. Professor Nyazee has pointed out other major differences between 
these values systems in his book Theories of Islamic Law. We will first summarize 
these differences and then quote the author to show the crucial difference between 
the Western and the Islamic approaches. 
The first point to note is that being a religious system, it is relatively easier in 
a Muslim society to arrive at a consensus about the values that the society upholds. 
In a Western society, on the other hand, it is difficult to arrive at such a consensus as 
there is no single binding philosophy or vision that the society is pursuing; the 
confusion that exists about the use of values is perhaps due to this reason.6 In Islamic 
law, on the other hand, the Muslim jurists clearly determined the values that the 
sharī‘ah pursues. They were able to do this after working on the texts for a few 
centuries, although some tend to attribute the discovery to the Companions of the 
Prophet. The jurists have claimed that the determination of the values is based on a 
process of induction that operates on the texts. It is also for this reason that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Id. at 29 
6 See generally, NYAZEE, THEORIES OF ISLAMIC LAW. These ideas are spread all over the book and it 
will be difficult to provide a pinpoint citation, unless it is a direct quotation or a specific idea. 
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claim that the values are definitive and there can be no confusion about these values.7 
In the Western system or any secular system, such a consensus is inconceivable. 
The second distinction that Professor Nyazee makes is based on the source of 
these values. He maintains that values in Islamic law are determined by the Lawgiver 
and, therefore, have a divine origin. He quotes al-Ghazālī to prove the point. 
As for maṣlaḥah, it is essentially an expression for the acquisition of 
manfa‘ah (benefit) or the repulsion of maḍarrah (injury, harm), but that is not what 
we mean by it, because acquisition of manfa‘ah and the repulsion of maḍarrah 
represent human goals, that is, the welfare of humans through the attainment of these 
goals. What we mean by maṣlaḥah, however, is the preservation of the ends 
(purposes) of the sharī‘ah.8  
Thus, values do not represent human goals that are determined by human 
reason, rather these are goals determined by the Lawgiver for human beings, that is, 
the vision to be pursued. The limitations of human reason to determine such values 
or ultimate principles has been pointed out by legal philosophers. For example, 
Bodenheimer says: 
Reason is the (limited) ability of the human intellect to comprehend and cope 
with reality. The reasonable man is capable of discerning general principles and of 
grasping certain essential relations of things …. Since the relations of men and things 
are often complex, ambiguous, and subject to appraisal from different points of view, 
it is by no means possible for human reason, in the majority of cases, to discover one 
and only one final and correct answer to a problematic situation presented by human 
social life …. It was therefore erroneous on the part of some representatives of the 
classical law of nature school to believe that a universally valid and perfect system of 
law could be devised, in all of its details, by a pure exercise of the human reasoning 
faculty operating in abstracto.9  
In the light of this, we may emphasize that the position taken by Islamic law 
on the recognition of interests is also the same as that discussed for the independent 
role of reason. Consequently, the systems proposed by Bentham or Roscoe Pound for 
the recognition of interests is by and large acceptable to Islamic law with the 
essential difference that human reason is not independently capable of recognizing 
all interests. 
Yet another distinction drawn by Professor Nyazee, and perhaps the most 
crucial, about the order in which values are taken up in the two systems of the 
priorities that are set by each society within the value structure. He states in several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  See generally AL-SHĀ ̣TABĪ, AL-MUWĀFAQĀT, vol. 1, trans. IMRAN A. NYAZEE, THE 
RECONCILIATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ISLAMIC LAW (2010). 
8 AL-GHAZĀLĪ, AL-MUSTAṢFĀ MIN ‘ILM AL-UṢŪL 286 (1877). 
9 EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE LAW 358 
(Rev. ed., 1974). 
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places in his book, Theories of Islamic Law, that Imām al-Ghazālī considers the five 
fundamental values to be essential for every society and civilization, because without 
the preservation of these values the society will collapse and lose its vitality. This 
statement is quite different from what has been asserted by Kelsen, to the effect that 
every society, especially one that is religious, has its own value system. On 
examination, we find al-Ghazālī’s statement to be true, because every society 
attempts to preserve life, national integrity, freedom of intellect and private property. 
The interests or values stated by Pound, Kelsen, or Bodenheimer appear to be no 
different. Nevertheless says Nyazee that there is a crucial difference. It is essential to 
quote his entire passage, so that the meaning is clearly grasped. The passage is the 
following: 
We now have a clear picture of the priorities postulated by the maqāṣid al-
sharī‘ah or the purposes of Islamic law. If we try to compare these with the 
priorities, actual or estimated, in Western countries it would help in understanding 
some of the differences between the two communities better. This may be done 
briefly here, because a detailed analysis would require an exhaustive study. 
We have seen above that the highest priority is assigned to the interest of Dīn 
by the jurists of Islam. Religion in the West, on the other hand, has been reduced to a 
level with a lowest priority. In fact, it is not even a public interest; it is a personal 
affair. Some Western scholars have hinted that the Muslim community should follow 
suit and reduce religion to a private affair. The privatization of Islam will alter the 
structure of the maqāṣid as seen by the fuqahā’. 
When we examine the priorities in certain Western countries as a whole, 
especially in countries like the United States of America, we get the impression that 
the priorities may be entirely reversed as compared to those for the maqāṣid. 
Consider, for example, the statement: What is good for General Motors is good for 
the United States. This would imply that the preservation and protection of wealth 
has the highest priority in the United States. Consider the preservation and protection 
of ‘aql. This is a lower category in the Islamic system, but it could be a higher 
category in the United States when viewed in terms of freedom of expression. 
As such a comparison needs to be based on accurate and reliable information 
requiring exhaustive research, we will not pursue the matter any further. The general 
idea was no more than to indicate that the priorities for the West might be visible in 
the reverse order.  
He makes the point that if the priorities are converted to those in the West, 
the nature of the values determined for Islamic law will change. He also suggests that 
the number one priority in the West is wealth and property, which is accorded the 
last priority in the Islamic system. If we examine what Richard Posner says, the 
statement appears to be quite true. Posner makes the following statement: 
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Economists …have tried to make of economics a source of moral guidance by 
proposing, often under the influence of utilitarianism, that the goal of a society 
should be to maximize average utility, or total utility, or wealth, or freedom, or 
equality …or some combination of these things. These are doomed efforts …. 
[Economists] could not tell policymakers how much weight to give costs and 
benefits as a matter of social justice.10  
What he means thereby is that even Utilitarians assign the highest priority to 
wealth maximization, it is difficult to measure the exact costs and benefits, but 
economic analysis of law can do so in precise dollar terms to show “the 
maximization of average utility.” Voices are being raised against the pursuit of this 
kind of approach, and one such writer is Joseph William Singer. He says: “How 
much is democracy worth, for example?  Are we willing to pay what it costs to hold 
elections?  What are the benefits of electing leaders rather than using heredity or 
some other selection criterion?  Just asking the question seems inappropriate. This is 
not the way we judge the appropriateness of democracy.”11 He maintains that money 
cannot be used as a basis for measuring values. 
Nyazee uses this distinction in another place to point the differences in the 
Western and Islamic approach to human rights. The text is as follows:  
The differences are understood when we notice that individual rights mean 
very little in themselves, unless they are related to other competing rights and 
interests. The system of rights is an integrated whole. The rights support each other 
and clash with each other often requiring delicate balancing by the lawmaker and 
judge. In other words, it is all a question of reconciliation, preference and priorities 
that a legal system has determined for itself. The priorities within the two systems we 
are considering are quite different. This can be grasped by examining the 
jurisprudential interests or the value-system within the Western legal systems and the 
purposes of Islamic law called the maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah. In the Islamic legal system 
there are five purposes that the system seeks to secure: preservation of the religious 
system (dīn), preservation of life, preservation of the family unit and its values, 
preservation of the intellect and the preservation of wealth. The priority assigned to 
these purposes exists in the order these have been stated. Thus, a child’s right to 
information, which falls under the preservation of his intellect, is limited by the 
interests that are superior to it; namely, family, life and religious system. Likewise, 
freedom of expression, again represented by intellect, will be restrained if it attempts 
to demolish an interest that is superior to it. In another work we suggested that these 
interests are different from those upheld in the West, and those in the West may be in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999), 46–47. 
11 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000), 129. 
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the reverse order. Whether or not this is proved to be true, the two systems are 
different, and the distinction lies in the priorities followed within the two systems.12  
The main distinctions between the meaning of values have now been 
understood. We may now turn to issues that pertain to the time when reasoning on 
the basis of values can be undertaken. After doing so, a few examples will be 
undertaken that may prove helpful for the reader and elaborate the significance of the 
use of values. Before we do this the issue of rationality of values needs to be 
addressed. 
2. The rationality of values and justice 
Scholars have maintained that even after we apply all the rules studied in the 
previous discussions, there is still a large element of discretion even in statutory 
interpretation, precedent and customs, and that in reality valid rules do not decide 
cases. It is for this reason that we hear statements like “general propositions do not 
decide cases,” (Holmes) and that “one of the most important interpretive factors is a 
trained sense of discretionary justice” (Allen).13 These discussions take place within 
the context of justice according to law. Justice according to law is provided through 
values, and this too is expressed by Holmes as “the inarticulate major premise of 
legal reasoning.”14 The word inarticulate indicates that the use and influence of 
values in legal reasoning is never openly acknowledged, and we have indicated a 
possible reason in the previous section. Dias maintains that the reason why courts 
prefer not to stress the influence of justice is that people think that law is law and 
judges have to apply it. The image people have in mind is that of a blind goddess 
maintaining the balance of law and delivering impartial justice.15 The very idea that 
some kind of discretion is creeping into legal reasoning is likely to give the 
impression that cases are being decided on personal whims. 
There is indeed a personal element, but this is not capricious; judges do have 
to administer laws as they find them, but there is more discretion in the process than 
is popularly supposed. This discretion, however, is controlled by a sense of values, 
which constitutes a consensual domain that keeps prejudice in check. Every decision 
reflects a value judgement on conflicting interests.16 If interests did not conflict there 
would be no disputes. “Values” consist of those considerations, which are viewed as 
objectives of the legal order and which shape the decisions of courts and guide their 
handling of the law by providing yardsticks for measuring the conflicting interests. 
By value judgement is signified the particular yardstick of valuation as well as the 
result of measuring interests with reference to the chosen value.17 What Dias is trying 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Nyazee, Islamic Law and Human Rights ISLAMABAD LAW REVIEW (2003) 1:62. 
13 See the chapter on values in R.W.M. DIAS, JURISPRUDENCE (London: 1979). 
14 As quoted in id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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to say in the above paragraphs is that there is a large element of “discretion” enjoyed 
by the judge whether he is interpreting a statute or whether he is interpreting and 
applying a precedent. When he faces this void, the judge relies on his “trained sense 
of discretionary justice” guided by values. Others have gone so far as to say that 
rules and principles do not decide cases, but it is the inarticulate “major premise of 
legal reasoning” or the sense of justice on which a decision depends. We keep on 
talking about the judge, but all those dealing with the legal system require this 
trained sense of discretionary justice, especially the lawyer who argues before the 
judge and tries to convince him as to what is just in a particular case. The sense of 
discretionary justice is no less important for those settling administrative issues. 
What the judge needs is this trained sense of discretionary justice guided by 
values. Is it something purely subjective or are there certain basic things on which all 
agree, starting from the meaning of justice. Bodenheimer has, therefore, focused 
mostly on the broad methodology that can be called the sense of justice. He has also 
tried to examine and justify the rationality of values on which this sense of justice is 
based.18 
In the light of the ever-changing conceptions in different ages and different 
nations and cultures, some jurists have maintained that theories of justice represent 
no more than the personal preferences of thinkers. Kelsen stated that the content of 
justice cannot be analysed in a rational manner. He gives a number of arguments. He 
says first that it is impossible to resolve certain types of conflicts in ethical 
convictions or values.19 For example, one fundamental ethical conviction is that 
human life is the highest of a all values. Existing side by side with this is the 
conviction that the highest value is the interest and honour of the nation.20 Next, 
everybody is obliged to sacrifice his own life and to kill other human beings in times 
of war. It is also deemed justified in the collective interest to inflict capital 
punishment as a sanction against criminal conduct. Further, according to Kelsen, it is 
impossible to decide this conflict regarding justice of killing human beings, in a 
rational scientific way.21 It is also not possible to identify in a meaningful manner the 
other supreme values which a just order of social life should attempt to promote. One 
person may regard the guarantee and enhancement of individual freedom as the 
foremost goal of legal ordering, another equality, and yet another security. 
Accordingly, the norms which are used as standards of justice vary from person to 
person, from group to group, and they are often mutually irreconcilable. Rational 
inquiry cannot validate social goals which justice is supposed to serve; all it can do is 
determine what means are necessary or conducive to the accomplishment of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, 201. 
19 Id. at 202 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUES AND INTERESTS 	  
ISLAMIKA INDONESIANA, Vol.1 Issue 2 (2014): 89 - 112 96 
ends of human effort. Kelsen reaches the conclusion that conceptions of justice must, 
under these circumstances, be viewed as irrational ideals.22 
At this stage it would be helpful to note what Kelsen’s arguments mean in 
terms of the purposes of Islamic law or the maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah. These purposes 
have a determined priority with religion being on top, followed by life, progeny, 
intellect and property; in that order. What Kelsen is saying is that the priority 
determined here does not appear to work all the time. In the case of the punishment 
of sariqah (theft), for example, we are really going against the determined priority 
and preferring property over life. In the case of the penalty for drinking khamr 
(wine), we prefer intellect over life, which again is contrary to the determined 
priority. This should lead to the raising of the following questions: Why does Islamic 
justice require the giving up of life for religion?  Why is it just to give up life for 
progeny in the case of rajm (stoning to death)?  Why is it just to cut off hands (life) 
for māl (property)?  
Bodenheimer trying to answer Kelsen’s argument about the irrationality of 
justice tries to say that rationality has two meanings. The first meaning of rationality 
is that which leads to definitive conclusions. The other meaning of rationality is one 
that leads to probable conclusions, but these are persuasive enough. It is on the basis 
of the second type of rationality that Bodenheimer builds his arguments. Kelsen, in 
his view, relies on the first type of rationality. For the first type of conception of 
rationality, he maintains that the intellectual history of Western civilisation offers a 
great deal of authority in favour of the proposition that judgements or conclusions 
can qualify as “rational” only in the event that it is based on certain, infallible, and 
indubitable knowledge.23 This is what is called qạt‘ī (definitive) in Islamic law. As 
was stated earlier quoting al-Shạ̄  tibī, the Muslim jurists derived the values on the 
basis of induction, which in their view leads to definitive conclusions. In other 
words, values in Islamic law are based on this first concept of rationality. 
Discussing the second concept of rationality, Bodenheimer states that there 
exists a broader conception of rationality in which we seek convincing grounds for 
our opinions and proofs for our conclusions. This conviction is proved in two ways: 
(a) On a thorough consideration of all factual angles, which are relevant to the 
solution of a normative problem. (b) A defence of the value judgements in the light 
of the historical experiences, psychological findings, and sociological insights. A 
rational argument and judgement of this character may be neither deductive not 
inductive nor strictly compelling from the logical point of view. If the extended 
notion of rationality is adopted, he says, the door is opened widely to rational 
inquiries about the issues of justice. Such inquiries may revolve around two sets 
problems: (i) those concerned with the discussion and determination of matters of 
empirical fact that have a bearing upon the answer to normative questions of justice. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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(ii) The making of choices between conflicting or potentially conflicting values of 
social order.24 
We may conclude from the above discussion that these problems exist for 
Western law, because the determination of values is based on human reason, and 
opinions differ about the conclusive nature of these values. In Islamic law, as the 
source is religious and divine, the rationality of the values and the priorities 
determined are not questioned.  
3. At what stage are values and interests used in Western law?  
The use of values in law was not acknowledged openly up until recently. There are 
writers who say that values should acknowledged openly in decisions and should be 
used frequently in law. Thus, Felix Cohen has written: 
When we recognize that legal rules are simply formulae describing 
uniformities of judicial decision, that legal concepts likewise are patterns or 
functions of judicial decisions, that decisions themselves are not products of logical 
parthenogenesis born of pre-existing legal principles but are social events with social 
causes and consequences, then we are ready for the serious business of appraising 
law and legal institutions in terms of some standard of human values.25  
In the previous discussion, we traced the use of value-oriented jurisprudence, 
which has been advocated by many legal philosophers. We also said that 
Bodenheimer has devoted a substantial part of his book to describe the development 
of these ideas. In modern times, the germs of such thinking are found in Kant, his 
student Rudolph Stammler, and Gustav Radbruch. In the United States, Bodenheimer 
begins with the work of Lasswell and McDougal, Edmond Cahn, Lon Fuller, Jerome 
Hall, and others.26 Even those who were not talking directly about values were 
indirectly concerned with them. Accordingly, introducing the chapter on “The 
Revival of Natural Law and Vaue-Oriented Jurisprudence,” Bodenheimer made the 
following statement: 
The twentieth century, however, witnessed a revival of natural-law thinking 
and value-oriented jurisprudence. Certain elements of legal idealism can be noticed 
already in some versions of sociological jurisprudence. Joseph Kohler saw the end of 
legal regulation in the promotion of culture but held an entirely relativistic view with 
respect to the ethical values to be served by a law dedicated to culture. Roscoe Pound 
defined the aim of the law in terms of the maximum satisfaction of human wants 
through ordering of human conduct by politically organized society. Although he 
viewed the rise of a new philosophy of values with sympathy, his own theory of law 
did not go much beyond a quantitative surveying of the multifarious interests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See id. on pages 203 to 206. 
25 Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 847 
(1935). 
26 See EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 134–68. 
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demanding satisfaction or requiring adjustment though the art of legal “engineering.” 
Twentieth century legal realism was well aware of the role which value judgements 
and considerations of social policy actually play in the legal process, but it refrained 
from building up a rational and objective theory of legal ends and social ideals.27  
It was also stated in that chapter by Bodenheimer that values belong to the 
field of the “ought.” Thus, Kelsen had said, “A judgement that an actual behaviour is 
such as it ought to be or ought not to be according to a valid norm is a value 
judgement.”28 This means that values belong to the “ought” of the law and the “is” of 
the law. Alf Ross had also opposed the use of values. Thus, he said: “To invoke 
justice is the same thing as banging on the table: an emotional expression which 
turns one’s demands into an absolute postulate.”29 Bodenheimer does not agree with 
Kelsen and Alf Ross. He explains that their arguments should be interpreted in the 
light of the different meanings of the term rationality. All this has been discussed in 
the previous section. 
The main point facing us is: when exactly are values given a role in legal 
decisions?  when do values really come into play. Although a limited role is 
acknowledged for values, Bodenheimer maintains that the evaluative factor—the use 
of values—is excluded from judicial decision-making when a norm is unambiguous 
in its core. If this core meaning is clearly applicable to the facts of the case, a 
recourse to values is not called for.30 The relationship of values with the core 
meaning shows us again the usefulness of the discussions about the core and the 
penumbra. As an example, Bodenheimer states that when homicide has been proved 
through uncontested evidence, the conclusion that the defendant committed murder 
can be proved by the logical method of syllogistic deduction. Likewise, where 
analogy or dialectical reasoning is used by the judge, the need for recourse to values 
is minimal if not totally unrequired.31 If, however, no historical precedent or similar 
guidance is available to the court for resolving the problem, the court has to rely on 
its own resources to fill the gap. In such a case, the court has to make a value 
judgement.32 He summarises the position as follows: 
The evaluative element in the judicial process is operative at its maximum 
level when judges fashion new norms in the unprovided case or discard obsolete 
rules in favour of timely ones. In such situations, the dialectical reasoning used by 
judges in weighing the advantages and drawbacks of contemplated courses of action 
often lacks the relative certainty and sometimes irrebuttable cogency of deductive, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Id. at 135. 
28 EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 397, relying on Kelsen, Norm and Value, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 
1624 (1966). 
29 EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 203, quoting ALF ROSS, LAW AND JUSTICE 274 (Berkely, 
1959). 
30 EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 398. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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inductive, and analogical reasoning. Choices between conflicting interests which are 
not directed by preexisting norms and principles require the making of value 
judgements.33  
He also maintains that over time, these value judgements become 
incorporated within the constitutional provisions, statutes and other types of sources, 
but then they may start losing their generality and start becoming rigid. A restriction 
that may be visible in the use of value judgements is that their incorporation is 
limited by a particular culture and its requirements.34 
We conclude from the above that values are activated when the core meaning 
is not applicable to the case under consideration and the usual methods of extension 
the meaning, already discussed, have been exahausted. This is what Bodenheimer 
has called the “unprovided case.” In the next section, we will see that the position in 
Islamic law is quite similar. 
4.  At what stage are values employed in Islamic law?  
The theory of the purposes of law or the theory of the use of values was developed 
and refined in the 5th century of the Hijra, that is, around the tenth century C.E. The 
main corpus of the law had already been developed, and this new theory did not 
really affect the laws of the different schools of law. Claims have been made by 
some that the values were actually being used without express acknowledgement.35 It 
has also been suggested that the use of these values is confined to the area of law that 
has to be developed by the state. What the earlier jurists did was confined to the core 
meanings found in the texts as well as their extension by means of accepted 
methods.36 Values have, therefore, never been used effectively to develop or change 
the law that attained maturity much before the time of development of the theory of 
values.37 One reason assigned for not using these ideas was that the Muslim nations 
began falling prey to the colonial onslaught.38 
Today, when the Muslim nations are free and scholars have started 
reexamining Islamic law, a tremendous amount of literature has been generated on 
the topic of maqāṣid. The use of values is being advocted by everyone, whether or 
not these advocates really understand the nature of these values or are skilled in their 
use. The subject is now assigned an independent status in university courses all over 
the world. The reason for this immense interest is that the objectives provide a rough 
and ready guide. Nevertheless, the actual cases in courts will obviously be much 
more complex. We may mention that the courts in Pakistan have started noting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Id. at 399. 
34 Id. 
35 For a detailed exposition of all this development, see NYAZEE, THEORIES OF ISLAMIC LAW. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUES AND INTERESTS 	  
ISLAMIKA INDONESIANA, Vol.1 Issue 2 (2014): 89 - 112 100 
significance of the maqāṣid. Thus, in Kaniz Fatima v. Farooq Tariq and others, a 
case of defamation against a newspaper, the learned Court had the following to say: 
I am therefore, of the considered opinion that no attempt on the part of any 
person individually, jointly or collectively to detract, defame or disgrace another 
person, thereby diminishing, decreasing and degrading the dignity, respect, 
reputation and value of life and more particularly on the part of a journalist, should 
be allowed to go with impunity. The situation is aggravated if it affects the honour 
and respect of any person in public life or in any concerned with collective good of 
the public, in any walk of life. There are six basic Maqasid-ul-Shari’ah, which are to 
be protected and they are Hifzul Din (protection of faith), Hifzul Nafs (protection of 
life), Hifzul Mal (protection of property), Hifzul Aql (protection of intellect), Hifzul 
Irz (protection of honour and dignity) and Hifzul Nasl (prosecution of paternity). In 
extreme case of causing damages to the honour and dignity and defaming by way of 
false allegations on the basis of sexual illicit relationship, it is punishable with Qazf, 
which provides punishment of 80 stripes and the evidence of such person is not to be 
accepted at all. In the case of other kinds of attack on the honour or dignity, the 
person who makes any such attempt should be saddled with financial liability by way 
of penalty or fine. Any such attempt is punishable in criminal as well as civil law 
both. In the present case a civil liability is under consideration.39  
The main purpose of the above quotation was to show that even if the judges 
do not understand the value system and its approach, they are beginning to become 
aware of the values, however, they still need to learn how to use them. Our main 
purpose so far has been to show the stage at which the purposes of the sharī‘ah or 
values as they are called are to be used for settling cases. This has been discussed 
above at some length, and the position is quite similar to that in Western law. A few 
points may be elaborated further to show the two areas where values come into 
operation. These are discussed below.  
The first is the case, where an interest conforms with the purposes of law, is 
compatible with the general principles of the law and has a specific text supporting 
its operation. This is the extended analogy that is designated as mulā’im 
(compatible) by al-Ghazālī. What happens here is that a cause at the level of the 
genus operates on a rule at the level of the lower category. In other words, this is a 
case where the cause or attribute identified is compatible with the purposes of the 
sharī‘ah, it is compatible with the general propositions or general principles of the 
sharī‘ah, and it is supported by some individual text of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.40 
Three conditions are set here. In Arabic, the language used for describing this is that 
the attribute identified should be: munāṣib (compatible with the purposes of the law); 
mulā’im (compatible with the general propositions of the sharī‘ah; and it should 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Mst. Kaniz Fatima v. Farooq Tariq and others, PLD 2002 Karachi 20 (emphasis added). 
40 IMRAN NYAZEE, THEORIES OF ISLAMIC LAW, 283 
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have a shahādat al-aṣl (support of an individual text).41 As the terms used are 
technical and may become difficult to understand, Nyazee has stated that in this type 
of analogy a general principle is used where the general principle has been derived 
directly from the texts.42 General principles always exist at a level that is higher than 
the rules that are subsumed under them. The method that this analogy employs is to 
assimilate two different rules under this principle. He compares the method in detail 
to show its similarity with the method used in Western law.43 
The second situation is where an interest conforms with the purposes of law, 
is compatible with the general principles of the law, but has no specific text 
supporting its operation. Within the attributes recognized at the level of the genus, 
there is a second type of analogy, which is also tested on the basis of the three 
standards listed above. The cause identified is tested to see if it is munāṣib 
(compatible with the purposes of the law); mulā’im (compatible with the general 
propositions of the sharī‘ah; and whether it is supported by a shahādat al-aṣl 
(support of an individual text). The difference between this and the previous type of 
analogy is that the third condition is not met. Thus, cause is munāṣib or it is 
compatible with the purposes of the law; it is mulā’im or is compatible with the 
general propositions of the sharī‘ah; however, there is no shahādat al-aṣl or support 
of an individual text for this type of analogy. 
In this case too Nyazee simplifies the type of analogy by stating that a general 
principle is used, but the general principle not been derived by the jurist directly from 
the texts.44 Analogy in this case too takes place in the same way, that is, the method 
that this analogy employs is to assimilate two different rules under this principle. The 
main difference between this method and the one described above is in the method of 
the identification of the general principle. In the previous method, the general 
principle is not stated expressly in the text, but is derived by the jurist from the 
implications of the texts. In the present case, the general principle is neither expressly 
stated in the texts nor is it derived from the implications of the texts: it is a general 
principle that the jurist conjures up, so to say, and verifies whether it is compatible 
with the purposes of the law as well as the general propositions of the sharī‘ah. It is 
this second type of analogy that is similar to the occasion in Western law when 
values are used. 
This completes our comparison of the use of values in the two systems, that 
is, of the methods of such use. After this comparison, we hope that a modern lawyer, 
judge or jurist will not find it difficult to relate modern law to the methods used in 
Islamic law. What remains is to provide a few examples in which values have 
actually been used or may be used. These are essentially two cases in the light of all 	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43 The reader may have recoure to the text in id. after page 283. 
44 Id. 
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that has preceded. The first is the case where a rule adopted by the existing law is 
changed in the light of the values of Islamic law. The second is the case where there 
is no provision in Islamic law for the issue and a principle may be derived to decide 
the case. In law, we can find many examples of cases in which values have been in 
the forefront. In particular, we may mention two American cases. These are State v. 
Shack45 and United States v. Progressive.46 We will focus on Islamic law in the 
following issues. 
5.  Application of values to alter an existing rule adopted by Islamic law 
The offence of rape under the ḥudūd laws prevalent in Pakistan was considered to be 
part of the offence of zinā liable to ḥadd. It was referred to as zinā bi’l-jabr, which is 
the same thing as rape. The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act, 
2006, altered this rule and converted this offence to rape, as it existed prior to the 
enforcement of ḥudūd laws in 1979. There was a considerable debate about the issue 
as the offence had been considered part of the ḥadd for fourteen centuries. The 
offence of rape or zinā bi’l-jabr is not mentioned in these terms either in the Qur’ān 
or in the Sunnah, although indirect references are found in the Sunnah. Thus, one of 
the conditions of using values that the new provision should not go against the text of 
the Qur’ān and the Sunnah was met.47 
In the existing Ḥūdūd laws, the philosophy of Islamic law of concealing sex 
offences as far as possible had been reversed and the focus was erroneously shifted 
to the punishment of the offence rather than the protection of the accused. Thus, 
under the Zinā Ordinance, 1979, there was an underlying attempt to trap the accused 
in every possible way and to punish him. The focus should have been on the 
protection of the accused. Likewise, the Qadhf Ordinance, which was supposed to 
protect the accused, incorporated a diluted form of the law of Qadhf. This had 
resulted in the erosion of the design and structure of the entire Islamic law on the 
subject. Further, the Qadhf Ordinance has borrowed phrases and provisions from the 
law of defamation given in the PPC. This has changed the nature of the law of Qadhf 
and made it ineffective. 
The main issue of academic interest was first: Why did the early jurists 
consider zinā bi’l-jabr to be similar to the offence of zinā as regards proof?   
• The reason is obvious; it is for the protection of an innocent person, who may be 
falsely accused of zinā in one of its forms. The protection is claimed as of right and it 
is a right given by God Almighty. Separating rape from zinā will amount to denying 
such protection to an innocent person and to the extinction of his God-given right. 
The jurists, therefore, considered the two offences as one. This translates into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 58 N.J. 297 (N.J. 1971). 
46 467 F.Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
47 The explanation that follows is excerpted from a report provided by Professor Nyazee that he 
submitted to the Ministry of Law, while he was a consultant there in 2006. Most of the text has been 
reproduced verbatim. 
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statement that the value of ‘irḍ (reputation of a person)48 prefers the interest of the 
accused rapist in his reputation over the bodily harm caused to the female accused.  
• The use of the word “zinā,” whether it is consensual or bil-jabr, invokes the 
provisions of qadhf along with its proof requirements (four witnesses) for consensual 
sex or rape. The Qur’ān does not qualify or make an exception in the case of rape. 
The moment the word “zinā” is used in the law, the Qur’ānic provisions of qadhf are 
invoked. The word zinā has been used in the Qur’ān as a general word. It has not 
been restricted by any text. The penalty for the slave girl has been halved by the 
Qur’ān, but it does not amount to restriction of the generality of the word zinā. 
Consequently, whether we designate zinā as consensual zinā or zinā bi ’l-jabr, the 
meaning still remains that of zina, and the provisions of qadhf will be invoked if an 
accusation pertaining to any of these offences turns out to be false.  
The next issue was: Is a person accused of rape entitled to the protection of the 
provisions of qadhf, that is, proof by four witnesses?  In this case, the interests of an 
innocent man, falsely accused of rape, and those of the victim of rape, a woman, 
stand pitted against each other. This is the clash of interests represented by this case. 
The decision of the fuqahā’ to include zinā bi ’l-jabr within the broader meaning of 
zinā is in line with the assertion, so often heard in the context of law and justice, that 
“it is preferable to let an innocent man go free than to punish a large number of 
criminals.” To understand this clash of interests, the offence of rape may be 
conceived as giving rise to four possible situations. 
• In the first case, we assume that a man has actually raped a woman and she 
accuses him of rape.  
• In the second case, we assume that a couple are having an affair and they are 
discovered in a compromising position. The zinā here was consensual, but the 
woman either on her own or on the insistence of her family (honour being at stake) 
accuses her paramour of rape.  
• In the third case, which is similar to the second, the man is unfaithful to the 
woman and does not wish to marry her. This angers her (hell hath no fury like a 
woman scorned) and using some appropriate situation she accuses him of rape.  
• In the fourth case, a man hires a prostitute and they are caught indulging in sex. 
The prostitute turns around and accuses the man of rape.  
• There is a fifth case too where a young couple elopes and they get married. This 
leads to cases of abduction and zinā liable to ta‘zīr.49 We will not consider the fifth 
case here. It is also to be emphasized that we are considering the law that existed 
prior to 2006, because the current law has changed.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Sometimes considered a sixth value. 
49 Ta‘zīr is the penalty prescribed by the state and is not found in the texts of the Qur’ān and the 
Sunnah. 
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When we consider all four cases, we can easily say that, while making law, except 
for the first case of actual rape, the remaining three cases give a clear right of 
protection to the accused under the qadhf provisions, that is, the production of four 
witnesses. Yes, there is a chance that even in the first case, the accusation is false 
(due to mistake), just as there is a slight chance that rape did take place in the 
remaining three cases as well. It can be readily seen that the situation is quite 
difficult for purposes of separating the offence of zinā from rape, and denying the 
accused the protection accorded to him by the strict proof of four witnesses is not 
that easy; the accused can claim this as his God-given right. It was for this reason 
that the earlier jurists did not separate the two offences as regards proof. In most such 
cases, the texts of the sharī‘ah would appear to grant the accused such protection. 
Does this mean that a rapist will go scott-free if four witnesses cannot be produced?  
The answer is a resounding yes, if rape is retained under the title of zinā bi ’l-jabr. 
The only solution appears to be to remove the offence called “zinā-bil-jabr” 
from the statute book and insert instead the offence of “rape,” with an appropriate 
Urdu equivalent without using the word zinā. Rape should then be interpreted to 
mean the “intent to cause severe bodily injury (or grievous hurt).” In other words, 
this offence should not be associated with the term zinā in any of its forms. This 
would not conflict with the Qur’ān or the Sunnah, as the texts do not mention zinā-
bil-jabr. In fact, the offence of zinā bi ’l-jabr has been created on the basis of 
analogy (qiyās) and crimes cannot be created on the basis of analogy in Islamic law 
(as that will permit the creation of ex-post facto offences by the qāḍī).50 
Those who claim that this offence has been created through the implication of 
the text (dalālat al-naṣṣ) should realise that the attribute of sex (third value) has been 
given priority over bodily harm (second value).51 This goes against the maqāṣid al-
sharī‘ah. Interpretation is undertaken according the the purposes of the sharī‘ah 
(maqāṣid), and the maqāṣid maintain that priority must always be accorded to bodily 
harm over matters of sex. Accordingly, rape, which is an attack on the physical 
person of the victim (including mental agony) cannot be included in the offence of 
zinā. It is an offence that falls in the category of ḥifẓ ‘alā ’n-nafs (protection of life). 
As the ofence has not been defined by the texts, it will be considered a 
siyāsah offence (modern writings have removed the distinction between siyāsah and 
ta‘zīr). It can, therefore, be proved by oral testimony of the victim and by any form 
of circumstantial or forensic evidence. As the victim is claiming bodily harm in the 
form of rape, the contrary inference of confessing to the offence of zinā cannot be 
drawn.52 If it is considered bodily injury, which it is, the accused does not have the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 This has been discussed in some detail in the previous chapter. 
51 It is here that Professor Nyazee’s arguments on the basis of values commence. 
52 The explanation of this statement is that when a woman complained of rape and then could not 
produce four witnesses, she was herself considered to have confessed to the offence of consensual 
sex or zinā. 
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protection of the provisions of qadhf The reason is obvious; he is similar to a 
murderer or an assailant. In this way, by preferring the value of bodily harm over that 
of reputation the interest of the victim, the woman attaked, can be preferred over that 
of the reputation over the accused, the rapist. 
The above were the arguments provided on the basis of values, towards the 
end, to treat the offence as an offence of rape. The Protection of Women Act, 2006 
did exactly as was proposed and the old offence of rape has now been revived. Thus, 
a rule existing on the statute book and in the traditional texts of the jurists was altered 
on the basis of values among other arguments and technical reasons. 
6.  Application of the rules for interests to the “unprovided” case 
In this section we will consider the case of intellectual property from the perspective 
of Islamic law, that is, whether intellectual property can be considered property and 
have a commercial value. The texts of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah do not indicate that 
such property can have value, nor do the writings of the jurists acknowledge it. It is, 
therefore, an “unprovided case,” as Bodenheirmer would call it, or it is a case that 
does not have an express basis (shahādat al-aṣl) as the Muslim jurists would say. 
The description is based on a prior study undertaken by this writer.53 It is a case in 
which the reasoning adopted was inadequate, and could have been much better if it 
was based on values rather than being right-based. A brief description follows, which 
has been excerpted from our artice that was published in Hamdard Islamicus in its 
2010 issue. 
“The importance of intellectual property in the modern world goes far beyond 
the protection of the creations of the mind. It affects virtually all aspects of economic 
and cultural life.”54 This statement applies to the underdeveloped world as well, 
which includes the Muslim world, yet many in the underdeveloped countries tolerate 
the widespread sale of counterfeit versions of IP products. The Islamic world 
continues to be part of this illegal activity with some claiming that such rights are un-
Islamic. 
It is imperative that Muslims internalize concepts of IP so that they can 
participate in and carve out a share in this enormous source of wealth. Realising this 
need, some Muslim scholars have tried to justify the use of intellectual property from 
the perspective of the Islamic sharī‘ah. The attempts made so far have been 
inadequate; indeed, superficial. Verdicts have been issued, but without even 
understanding fully what intellectual property means and how it is to be dealt with. 
The complexity and uniqueness of this form of property is ignored in such verdicts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See Samia Maqbool Niazi, The Poverty of Ijtihād: A Case Study of Intellectual Property Rights, 
HAMDARD ISLAMICUS 33:3 & 4, 103–150(2010). 
54 WIPO, WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE, 2nd ed. (Geneva: 
WIPO Publication No. 489 (E), 2004), 422. 
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It is pertinent to state at the outset that Pakistan, like most Muslim countries, 
has a comprehensive set of intellectual property laws, and these laws are periodically 
updated to conform to international standards and norms of the intellectual property 
law.55 Enforcement mechanisms are weak, but progress is slowly and painfully being 
made. Only a few cases come up to the level of the High Courts and the Supreme 
Court, and most issues are settled at the lower level.56 Our issue, however, is 
somewhat different. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 
requires that “no law shall be made that is repugnant to the injunctions of the Qur’ān 
and the Sunnah.” This provision is the basis of what is called the “Islamisation of 
laws in Pakistan.” In 1980, a special court called the Federal Shariat Court of 
Pakistan was created, outside the regular hierarchy of courts in Pakistan, to “strike 
down” all those laws that conflict with or are repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. 
This Court of its own accord57 took up the matter of intellectual property rights in a 
case that we consider at length in this paper. Since that landmark case, the scope of 
intellectual property rights in Pakistan has been widened, and it is expected that a 
petition will be filed, sooner rather than later, to strike down some of these laws as 
they are against the principles of Islamic law. This means that forward looking 
interpretation, or ijtihād, has to be undertaken by Muslim scholars before such a 
petition is filed. The arguments given so far are not adequate. Much more has to be 
done before the laws are challenged in the Federal Shariat Court. 
Contemporary Muslim jurists are divided over the issue of IP. Those who 
fervently stick to the position of the classical scholars augment their position against 
the concept of IP by arguing that knowledge belongs to Allah alone, and is merely a 
trust for humans to use and share with others. They also rely on the tradition of the 
Prophet (SAW) which says, “Do not sell what you do not have,” thus implying that 
IP rights cannot be possessed and owned and, therefore, cannot be sold. In addition, 
they allude to uncertainty (gharar), which may be an important attribute of almost all 
IPRs. On the other hand, there are scholars who have accepted the premise that ideas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 The intellectual property system is implemented by the Intellectual Property Organisation of 
Pakistan. The different laws include: Trademarks Act 1940, Trademarks Ordinance 2001, Patents & 
Designs Act, 1911( as amended by the Patents Ordinance 2002 & Designs Ordinance, 2000), Designs 
Ordinance 2000, Registered Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits Ordinance, 2000, Copyrights 
Ordinance 1962 (constantly amended). Work is underway at the IPO Pakistan on “Geographical 
Indications,” a draft Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) Bill of Pakistan has been submitted to the 
parliament for enactment. Work is also being undertaken on preparing laws for “Genetic Resources,” 
“Traditional Knowledge,” “Folklore” and other areas. 
56 Some of the cases that dealt directly or indirectly with intellectual property rights have been: 
Hotel Metropole Ltd v. Performing Rights Society, PLD 1967 Kar 168 (copyrights); Carl Zeiss 
Stiftung v. Carl Zeiss Stiftung, Jena, PLD 1968 Karachi 276 (trademarks); Societe De Fabrication v. 
Deputy Registrar of Trademarks and another, PLD 1979 Kar. 83; Alpha Sewing Machine v. Registrar 
of Trademarks and another, PLD 1990 SC 1074; Morphy Richards Ltd v. Registrar of Trademark and 
another, 1992 MLD 2506; Select Sports case, PLD 1998 Lah 69; Glaxo v. Evron, 1992 CLC 2382; 
Cooper’s Incorporated v. Pakistan General Stores, 1981 SCMR 1039; Bolan Beverages v. Pepsico 
Inc., 2004 CLD 1530; Concentrate Mfg. Co. v. Seven-up Bottling, 2002 CLD 77; Roomi Enterprises 
v. Stafford Miller, 2005 CLD 1805 (DB); and Acer Inc. v. Acer Computers, 2004 CLD 1131. 
57 In most other cases petitions are filed in the Court to strike down the questioned laws. 
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and methods can be protected under the rubric of intellectual property. Nevertheless, 
their arguments have not been found to be very convincing by the majority of 
Muslims. 
Most analyses of intellectual property rights by Muslim scholars focus on a 
few well known types; namely, copyright, patents, trademarks and trade secrets. The 
concept of intellectual property has now expanded to include many other things.58 
Today, a few questions may be raised that require answers. As copyright law protects 
only the form of expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves, the questions to be 
raised are: Can expression alone be protected under Islamic law?  Does it give rise to 
some kind of right that requires protection?  If so, what is the nature of such a right?  
In patents and industrial designs, it is the underlying idea that is protected. How does 
Islamic law protect an idea?  In other things, it is either a mark, name, geographical 
name and so on. Each requires separate analysis from the Islamic perspective. In 
copyrights, moral rights remain with the original author, even when he has 
transferred his economic rights to another. Can this be permitted under Islamic law?  
Does this amount to a conditional transfer and will Islamic law permit this?  Most 
intellectual property is limited by time. Copyright has a duration of 50 years after the 
death of the owner. In some countries this has been extended to 70 years. This is for 
the benefit of the heirs. The question is: can such a limit be imposed on the basis of 
the sharī‘ah?  A trade name or mark may be renewed forever it appears (for a fee), 
but what is its real life?  Again, will Islamic law acknowledge a right in a work that 
is based on musical compositions and performances?  Can the rights of performers 
be intermingled with this right?  What is the basis according to Islamic law?  The 
expression protected by copyright can be sold again and again. What kind of right is 
involved here?  Can one thing be sold again and again under the sharī‘ah?  Most of 
these questions have not been addressed by Muslim scholars. 
The main problem faced by Muslim scholars is that the earlier jurists 
followed the same old idea of property that was followed by the rest of the world up 
until a hundred years ago. It is a narrow concept and considers property to be 
confined to corporeal things that can be taken into physical possession. Some jurists 
extend it to the usufruct or the benefit emerging from them as well. This concept 
cannot work for intellectual property, which is now considered and analyzed in terms 
of rights. The Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan and some well known scholars tried 
to overturn this narrow concept and to bring it in line with modern concepts. The 
reasoning of the Court are first recorded and analyzed followed by the reasoning 
provided by Mawlana Taqi Uthmani a well known scholar. Finally, a suggestion will 
be made as to why value based reasoning would have been much more effective 
rather than a rights based reasoning. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Intellectual property “means the legal rights which result from intellectual activity in the 
industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields.” WIPO, WIPO Handbook, 3. 
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The Federal Shariat Court invited comments of the public about the Trade 
Marks Act, 1940 and twenty-two other Acts, through a notice dated 15. 7. 1982. The 
Ulema did not respond to the notice, therefore, the Court proceed to examine the law 
on its own.59 The issue, with respect to the Trade Mark Act, was: Whether a trade 
mark, a copyright or patent is property that is assignable and tranferable.60 The Court 
observed that as the concepts underlying such property were developed after the 
Industrial Revolution, it is not possible to find a precedent for such property in the 
sharī‘ah. The Court then proceeded to trace the development of the concepts of 
property and ownership, trying to show that these concepts have changed with the 
change in ideas.61 Until the 19th century these concepts were limited to corporeal 
property. The elements of such ownership were identified as control and exclusive 
use along with the right to exclude others from enjoyment.62 This changed too, and 
the Court quoted Roscoe Pound to show that formerly there were no reservations 
about the absolute rights of the owner, but gradually the restrictions on these rights 
as well as the rights of others were recognised.63 The Court noted that the initial 
concept of property was that of tangible or intangible property, or movable and 
immovable property in Europe, but in English law the main classification was that of 
real and personal property, which meant choses in possession and choses in action.64 
The reasons for such a classification were identified by the Court through a number 
of definitions. 
According to the Court, it was John Salmond, who for the first time widened 
the definition of property to include intellectual property rights. 65  The Court 
considered this “a vast improvement upon the law of property,”66 Paton, as the Court 
notes, disagrees. He states: “The distinction between land, houses and things under 
the land (which are corporeal) and such things as rents (which are incorporeal) may 
be a convenient one but tends to confuse.”67 After this Paton raises another objection, 
which should have been the major focus of Muslim scholars undertaking ijtihād 
today. The Court notes this, and Paton says:  
Once we speak of ownership of things, which are not corporeal, where 
are we to stop?  My reputation is in a broad sense but it would be straining language 
to say that I own that incorporeal res. It is perhaps a pity that the word 
“ownership” was not confined to corporeal things and another term used where 
incorporeal res are concerned.68  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 PLD 1983 FSC 125, 127. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 128. 
64 Id. 
65 JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 12th ed., 110 quoted in PLD 1983 FSC 125, 129. 
66 Id.. 
67 PATON, JURISPRUDENCE, 458 quoted in PLD 1983 FSC 125, 129. 
68 PATON, JURISPRUDENCE, 458 as quoted in PLD 1983 FSC 125, 129–30 (emphasis added). 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VALUES AND INTERESTS 	  
ISLAMIKA INDONESIANA, Vol.1 Issue 2 (2014): 89 - 112 109 
Thereafter, the Court makes an observation to identify the latest meaning property 
current in the West, especially in the U.S.A.69 
The Court then turns to the meaning of property in Islamic law. Relying on 
some source, the Court observes that property or māl in Islamic law is “a thing which 
one desires and which can be stored to meet the future requirements.”70 The Court 
then notes the crucial point that property is something that is assigned a value by the 
people. “The criteria for determining whether a thing is property is that it be treated 
by mankind as property (māl) and a thing of value.”71 
The Court then notes the distinction drawn by the Ḥanafī jurists between a 
thing and its usufruct. There is ownership (milk) in the case of usufruct, but it is not 
property. The Court then dwells on the view of Imām al-Shāfi‘ī as elaborated by 
Yūsuf Mūsā. Referring to his opinion, the Court observes, “He approved of this 
definition because the object is not really the corporeality of the property but the 
benefit derived from it and this is also in accordance with the usage and customs 
among people. This according to his opinion also corresponds to contemporary 
law.”72 The Court adds further that according to Yūsuf Mūsā. “Everything from 
which benefit can be derived is property provided that the acquisition of benefit 
therefrom is not prohibited in Sharia.”73 
The Court, after describing what is perfect and imperfect ownership 
according to the Ḥanafīs, moves on to the views of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Sābūnī. 
“Sabooni says that the definition of the jurists [that is, of property] is rather limited 
than the definition of mal or property in the contemporary law.”74 The Court then 
comments on this saying: “But this view is fallacious since it does not appear to take 
into account the much wider definition of Imam Shafie that everything is māl which 
fetches value if it is sold and if it is destroyed raises a liability for reparation.”75 The 
Court then implies that trade-marks, trade-names, patents and copyrights can all be 
included in this definition.76 In support the Court refers to Yūsuf al-Qarḍāwī, who 
appears to agree with this view. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 PLD 1983 FSC 125, 130. The Court cites a number of cases in support of this statement: Eric v. 
Walsh, 61 A 2d 1, (4); 135 Conn. 85; Todeva v. Iron Min co.,  45 N.W. 2d 782 (788); 232 Minn. 422; 
Waring v. Dunlea,  DCNC 26 F. Supp. 338 (340); Button v. Hikes, 176 S W 2d 112 (115, 117) 296 
Ky. 163; 150 ALR 779; Bogan v. Wiley,  202 P. 2d 824, (827); 90 Cal. App. 2d 288; Department of 
Insurance v. Motors Ins. Corpn. Ind. 138 NE 2d 157 (163); Button v. Drake,  195 SW 2d 66 (68, 69); 
302 Ky. 517; 167 ALR 1046; and Downing v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Fransisco, 
198 P. 2d 293 (926, 927); 88 Cal. App. 2d 345. 
70 In our view, the source is IBN ‘ĀBIDĪN, RADD AL-MUḤTĀR (Cairo, 1386–89/1966–69), vol. 4, 3. 
71 PLD 1983 FSC 125, 131. 
72 The reference is to the work of Yūsuf Mūsā, al-Amwāl wa Naẓariyyat al-‘Aqd, 162, quoted in PLD 
1983 FSC 125, 132. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 134. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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The Court also refers to Mawlāna Ashraf Ali Thanwī, to Muftī Kifayatullah, 
and also to the adverse comments in Fatawa Rashidia and the work of Mufti Shafi.77 
Thereafter, the Court refers to an adverse comment published in a journal where 
validity of copyright is opposed on the ground that it is not lawful to sell knowledge. 
The article is by Dr. Ahmad al-Hijji Kurdi. The detailed views of the writer are 
reproduced and then the views are rejected by the Court. What is of interest for us 
here is that this analysis is quite similar to the analysis presented by Taqi Usmani, 
but the analysis of the learned Court came earlier. 
In the end, the Court gives its conclusion as follows: 
It is important to note that the definition of Imam Shafie as accepted by 
Malikies and Hamblies has included in the category of Mal (property), everything 
which has a money value. It was a great advance on the jurisprudence in the world of 
that age since for the first time only Salmond could arrive at an analogous definition. 
The definition from Imam Shafie corresponds to the modern definition which is 
found in the precedents referred to above from the judgments of the Courts. The 
provisions of the Act are not repugnant to Shariah.78  
The main points relied upon by the Court, for its conclusion, are, first, that 
intellectual property rights are a new category of rights, and with the changing times 
the definition of property has to change to accept the new types as was done in the 
law, otherwise it will kill all kinds of incentive for creative activity. Second, that the 
definition of māl is not based upon the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and has been given by 
each jurist “according to his own lights.”79 Third, that property is considered as such 
when people assign it such a value according to their usage and custom. Fourth, and 
finally, that the definition of māl given by Imām al-Shāfi‘ī is quite flexible and wide 
and should obviously, and does, include this new category of rights. As such this 
definition represents a great advance and matches the definition given much later by 
Salmond. 
The effort by the Court is commendable. In fact, this case (decided in 1983) 
appears to provide source material for much of what Justice Taqi Usmani said later.  
Consequently, there is no point in repeating the arguments advanced by 
Justice Taqi Usmani, as well as the sources relied upon him, are quite similar to 
those stated in the case decided by the Federal Shariat Court in 1983 and discussed 
above. The only difference is that Justice Usmani has presented the arguments with 
greater sophistication based upon his superior knowledge of Islamic law.80 Just to 
give a flavour of his reasoning, we may reproduce the following words: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Id. at 135. 
78 Id. at 137–38. 
79 Id. at 137. For this the Court relies on the comments of Sābūnī. 
80 The detailed arguments may be examined in MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, BAY‘ AL-ḤUQŪQ AL-
MUJARRADAH, vol. 1, 125. 
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It appears to this humble servant, may Allāh protect him, that the right to a trade 
name or trademark, even though it was originally a pure right that was not 
established in an existing tangible property, but after governmental registration 
which requires immense efforts and the incurring of substantial amounts, acquires a 
legal form that resembles transcribed certificates in the hand of the bearer. In the 
official registers it resembles a right established in tangible property. It is, therefore, 
linked in mercantile practice with tangible property. It is, therefore, necessary that 
compensation be paid in lieu of it by way of sale as well.  
With due respect for the erudition of Justice Usmani, we find it difficult to 
accept these arguments. First of all certificates are not tangible property, they are 
choses in action. The Companies Ordinance, 1984, following an Indian amendment, 
declares a share certificate as movable property, but that rule has not been tested by 
the courts nor is its rationale visible.81 Second, these are not legal arguments. They 
may be adequate to convince a layman, but they cannot be considered legal 
reasoning. Third, even if this argument is considered adequate legal reasoning, it has 
nothing to do with Islamic law. It amounts to saying the following: “The 
Government of the United States has registered it and issued a receipt or a certificate, 
therefore, it is Islamic and can be sold under the provisions of Islamic law.” How can 
such an argument hold water?  The learned Justice Usmani then adds that the 
registration should be done in a lawful way and there should be no element of 
deception. This, we feel, is merely window-dressing for a very weak legal argument. 
We would like to conclude by saying that had the court taken up arguments 
on the basis of the purposes of the sharī‘ah or the values upheld by the legal system, 
especially the fifth purpose of protection of property, the arguments would have 
gained immense strength. The fifth purpose of protection of property would require 
that anything that protects property must be protected; and, intellectual property 
today is doing exactly that. 
7.  General rule about interests and values 
In the end, we may recall a general rule that should be noted for the use of value 
based arguments in courts. This rule requires that values be invoked, in particular, for 
creating new rules when there is no identifiable basis in the texts for deciding a case. 
This rule applies to both law and to Islamic law, and has been elaborated in detail in 
the description that has proceeded. 
This brings to close our comparative study about the techniques and methods 
used by judges and jurists in the law as well as Islamic Law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Perhaps, it is to impose the punishment of theft in the criminal law. 
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